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Giving Due Process Its Due:  Why 
Deliberate Indifference Should Be 
Confined to Claims Arising Under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
Shad M. Brown* 
Abstract 
This Note discusses culpability requirements for claims 
brought by pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. The initial 
focus is on deliberate indifference, a culpability requirement 
formulated under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause but 
symmetrically applied to claims arising under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Note then shifts to 
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, a landmark Supreme Court decision that 
casts doubt on the application of Eighth-Amendment standards to 
Fourteenth-Amendment claims. Finally, this Note advocates for the 
application of objective unreasonableness, a different culpability 
requirement, to claims arising under the Due Process Clause. It 
does so on the basis that due process is a dynamic concept, 
independent of the Eighth Amendment’s demands. 
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In an impressive body of decisions this Court has decided that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a 
demand for civilized standards which are not defined by the 
specifically enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights. They 
neither contain the particularities of the first eight amendments 
nor are they confined to them. 
—Justice Felix Frankfurter (1947) 
I. Introduction 
Pretrial detainees—those who are in government custody in 
connection with a crime for which they have not been convicted1—
have suffered because of a failure to distinguish.2 Imagine that a 
man named Anthony is arrested for driving under the influence. 
The arresting officer searches his car and discovers an empty bottle 
of insulin with his name on the prescription label. Anthony tells 
the officer that he is diabetic and in need of the full prescription at 
his apartment. The officer transports him straight to the local jail, 
where he informs a corrections officer of the statement and the 
empty prescription before going about his day. The corrections 
officer does not think that Anthony’s condition is serious and 
processes him like any other new arrival. A few hours later he is 
found unconscious on the floor of his cell, suffering from a diabetic 
coma. 
Anthony, a pretrial detainee, files a lawsuit alleging that the 
corrections officer deprived him of his right to adequate medical 
care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though the 
substantive law is derived from a constitutional provision,3 the 
claim itself is brought into court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal 
statute.4 During the litigation, the officer testifies that he did not 
 
 1. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating 
that pretrial detainees “are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of 
innocence”). 
 2. See infra notes 240–260 and accompanying text (differentiating the Due 
Process Clause from the individual provisions contained in the Bill of Rights). 
 3. See 2 ISIDORE SILVER, POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 8A.09 (Matthew Bender & 
Co. rev. ed. 2019) (discussing various types of claims alleging unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement). 
 4. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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realize that the lack of insulin could have such dire consequences. 
Whether or not Anthony can overcome this claim is largely 
dependent on where the suit was filed.5 If it is filed in Atlanta, he 
will have to prove that the officer was actually aware of the danger 
a lack of insulin can have for a person with diabetes—a 
consequence of the culpability requirement known as “deliberate 
indifference.”6 
Anthony should not be subject to the test for deliberate 
indifference simply because he filed a claim in Atlanta. The issue 
with this imposition does not stem from the fact that proof of 
culpability is required generally but rather that the wrong kind of 
culpability is being applied.7 This Note argues for the uniform 
application of a different culpability standard:  That pretrial 
detainees’ claims alleging unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement should be subject to the test for objective 
unreasonableness instead of deliberate indifference. 
As determined by the Supreme Court, deliberate indifference 
is the second prong of a test that governs claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 alleging unconstitutional prison conditions in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.8 
It requires a defendant to have subjective awareness that her 
conduct creates a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner.9 Without 
properly alleging and proving that this “sufficiently culpable state 
of mind” existed at the time she was injured, a prisoner cannot 
successfully state a claim that the conditions of her confinement 
violated the Eighth Amendment.10 The Court has justified 
 
jurisdictional nature of a federal statute). 
 5. See infra notes 171–261 and accompanying text (discussing a current 
split among federal Courts of Appeals). 
 6. See infra notes 246–256 (discussing an opinion published by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). 
 7. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352–53 (discussing the requirement that 
something more than “mere negligence” is required for a constitutional violation). 
 8. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (“To violate the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently 
culpable state of mind.”). 
 9. See id. at 837 (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw that inference.”). 
 10. See id. at 834 (“It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner 
at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison 
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deliberate indifference on the basis that it adheres to precedent 
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to be 
violated only by the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”11 
The problem lies in this connection between deliberate 
indifference and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.12 
That constitutional provision governs the conditions of correctional 
facilities as they relate to prisoners—people who have been 
convicted of a crime.13 The substandard and harmful jail conditions 
affecting pretrial detainees are instead governed by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The peculiarities 
of the two constitutional provisions are not coextensive.15 While the 
Eighth Amendment allows a prisoner to be punished within 
certain limits, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment 
entirely.16 
In its landmark 2015 decision Kingsley v. Hendrickson,17 the 
Supreme Court considered the dichotomy between the two 
amendments in-depth.18 In particular, the Court discussed the 
absence of permissible punishment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.19 The case ultimately resulted in two distinct 
 
officials responsible for the victim’s safety.”). 
 11. See id. (discussing the requirements for harm that rises to the level of an 
Eighth Amendment violation). 
 12. See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text (discussing the relative 
differences between prisoners, pretrial detainees, and the constitutional 
provisions that protect them). 
 13. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(discussing the relative constitutional statuses of prisoners and pretrial 
detainees). 
 14. See id. (“Pretrial detainees stand in a different position:  [T]hey have not 
been convicted of anything, and they are still entitled to the constitutional 
presumption of innocence.”). 
 15. See infra notes 267–272 and accompanying text (discussing the 
independent nature of the Due Process Clause). 
 16. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350 (“Thus, the punishment model is 
inappropriate for [pretrial detainees].”). 
 17. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) (holding that 
a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used 
against him was objectively unreasonable in order to demonstrate that it was 
excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). 
 18. See id. at 400 (“The language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature 
of the claims often differs.”). 
 19. See id. (“And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted 
prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” 
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culpability standards for excessive-force claims, depending on 
whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee claiming protection 
under the Due Process Clause or a prisoner pointing to the Eighth 
Amendment.20 Under this new regime, a pretrial detainee only 
needs to provide objective evidence to satisfy the culpability 
requirement.21 
In the wake of the Kingsley decision, lower courts have 
reevaluated the application of the deliberate indifference standard 
to pretrial detainees’ claims of unconstitutional jail conditions.22 
While some view it as a broad statement on the Due Process 
Clause,23 others perceive it as too narrow to overturn established 
precedent.24 The former group is correct on the basis of the 
language used in Kingsley.25 
However, the issue is broader than that identified in Kingsley 
and its progeny.26 Courts were mistaken in mechanically grafting 
the deliberate indifference standard to due-process claims in the 
first place.27 Kingsley primarily discussed the punishment 
dichotomy, but that is only a single consequence of the proper 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.28 That constitutional 
provision is both broader than and independent of the individual 
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, including the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.29 It is this concept 
 
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72, n.40 (1977))). 
 20. See id. at 397 (discussing the appropriate culpability standard for a 
pretrial detainee’s excessive-force claim). 
 21. See id. at 396–97 (“[A] pretrial detainee must show only that the force 
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”). 
 22. See infra notes 171–250 (discussing cases dealing with the culpability 
issue subsequent to the decision in Kingsley). 
 23. See infra notes 175–225 (discussing courts that have applied objective 
unreasonableness to pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims). 
 24. See infra notes 232–251 (discussing courts that continue to apply 
deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims). 
 25. See infra notes 288–298 and accompanying text (supporting the notion 
that Kingsley requires a broader application of objective unreasonableness). 
 26. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing the contours of 
the Due Process Clause). 
 27. See infra notes 280–287 and accompanying text (discussing the 
independent character of the Due Process Clause). 
 28. See infra notes 267–281 and accompanying text (stating that due process 
“consists of collective standards that take on their own character”). 
 29. See infra notes 280–287 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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that should give courts pause before creating parallels between 
individual rights and due process protections.30 The independent 
character of the Due Process Clause has always demanded that 
distinct culpability standards at least be considered for those 
claiming its protections.31 Kingsley merely provided the candidate. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the 
fundamentals of culpability requirements and deliberate 
indifference. This begins with a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
statute that provides jurisdiction to federal courts over various 
claims brought by both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. 
The focus there is on the statute’s nature as a procedural device, 
effectively covering different claims that are governed by their own 
unique substantive law. After that, the history and purpose of the 
deliberate indifference standard are explored before a discussion 
on courts’ justifications for applying it to pretrial detainees’ claims. 
Part III discusses Kingsley v. Hendrickson and the legal 
landscape it has created. First, there is a discussion of the case 
itself. The focus is directed to the part of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning that dealt with the differences between pretrial 
detainees, prisoners, and their respective constitutional rights. 
Next, the discussion focuses on Courts of Appeals opinions that 
have directly grappled with the implication that Kingsley 
necessitates the elimination of deliberate indifference as a 
requirement for pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement 
claims. 
Part IV advocates for the application of an objective 
unreasonableness standard in place of deliberate indifference. The 
discussion is initially directed at the expansive scope and character 
of the Due Process Clause. In particular, it focuses on the 
relationship between that provision and the individual guarantees 
contained in the Bill of Rights. Next, the emphasis is on Kingsley’s 
reasoning and how it relates to the expansive interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause. The conversation then shifts to the 
 
peculiarities of the Due Process Clause). 
 30. See infra notes 283–288 and accompanying text (admonishing the rote 
application of standards derived from the Bill of Rights to the Due Process 
Clause). 
 31. See infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text (stating that due-process 
standards “stand on their own, not to be determined by the scope, character, or 
particularities” of the Eighth Amendment). 
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justifications offered for the application of deliberate indifference 
to pretrial detainees’ claims. The majority of this conversation 
focuses on the inconsistencies between those justifications and the 
expansive interpretation of due process. The argument then 
concludes by demonstrating that the application of the objective 
standard requires only a minute change to the existing framework 
for conditions-of-confinement claims. The practical importance of 
this change are demonstrated through a hypothetical situation. 
II. Fundamentals and Background 
Claims alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement 
are brought into court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32 Although the 
statute applies to both prisoners and pretrial detainees, it 
primarily acts as a procedural device that grants a court 
jurisdiction.33 This results in the application of distinct substantive 
law, depending on the underlying violation.34 
When that violation is the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause, conditions-of-confinement claims require a plaintiff to 
prove the defendant’s culpability under the deliberate indifference 
standard.35 This is a subjective standard that has been explicitly 
determined by the Supreme Court to apply in those cases.36 Similar 
claims brought by pretrial detainees allege violations of the Due 
Process Clause.37 Lower courts have equally applied deliberate 
indifference to those claims in the absence of any express guidance 
by the Supreme Court.38 
 
 32. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (creating an “action at law” where there is a 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution”). 
 33. See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text (examining the 
relationship between § 1983 and an underlying violation of federal law). 
 34. See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text (discussing culpability 
requirements for § 1983 claims). 
 35. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective 
inquiry for prisoners’ conditions-of-confinement claims). 
 36. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:  
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3:7 (4th ed. 2013) (stating the culpability standards 
for various claims brought under the Eighth Amendment). 
 37. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing claims that are 
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 38. See infra notes 95–102 (discussing lower courts’ analysis of pretrial 
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The following subparts explore the fundamentals and 
background of both § 1983 and the deliberate indifference 
standard. In particular, they examine the procedural nature of 
§ 1983 and the reasoning behind a subjective culpability 
requirement for unconstitutional punishments. This Part will 
conclude with a discussion of courts’ justifications for applying 
deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims. 
A. Section 1983 Actions 
The earliest Civil Rights Acts were passed in the post-Civil 
War era to provide relief for African Americans in the former 
Confederacy.39 The purpose of the initial Act was to confer all of 
the civil rights realized by whites to freedwomen and freedmen.40 
So that its provisions could be enforced as intended, the Act 
granted subject matter jurisdiction to district courts over lawsuits 
in which citizens claimed that their civil rights had been violated.41 
The second Act was put into place with the purpose of enforcing 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The next year, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 amended the statute, providing federal 
courts with subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under 




 39. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983:  Doctrinal Foundations and an 
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484–85 (1982) (discussing the social 
forces that led to original enactment of the statute as Section 1 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871). 
 40. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 509 (1939) (“None 
other than citizens of the United States were within the provisions of the Act.”). 
 41. See id. (discussing the practical effects of the first Civil Rights Act). 
 42. See id. at 510 (stating that the second Civil Rights Act was put in place 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment “pursuant to the authority granted 
Congress by the fifth section of the amendment”). 
 43. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1973) 
superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 
(including the District of Columbia under the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 
(“Congress had neither the means nor the authority to exert any direct control, 
on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state officials. The solution chosen was 
to involve the federal judiciary.”). 
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The current version of the 1871 Act is encoded at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.44 This is the vehicle through which an individual pursues 
relief for a constitutional violation committed by a state or its 
officials.45 The essential elements required by the statute ask 
whether the defendant, acting “under color of state law,” deprived 
the plaintiff of some federally-guaranteed right, immunity, or 
privilege.46 The phrase “under color of state law” refers to acts 
made possible only because the defendant—also known as a state 
actor—has some authority granted to him by a state or one of its 
subdivisions.47 Once this authority is established, the plaintiff 
must prove the state actor’s conduct violated an underlying federal 
right.48 
Section 1983 does not impose a specific “state-of-mind” 
requirement.49 Nothing in the text or legislative history conveys a 
congressional intent to limit claims on the basis of a state actor’s 
motive in violating a plaintiff’s rights.50 However, the statute still 
requires some state of mind to be proven with respect to the 
 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (stating that the statute is “derived from act 
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.”). 
 45. See id. 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
 46. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (stating the initial inquiry 
required for any § 1983 claim). 
 47. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power, 
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”). 
 48. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1986) (discussing the 
different requirements between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its criminal counterpart, 18 
U.S.C. § 242). 
 49. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534 (finding that the question of whether 
negligence is a sufficient state of mind in a § 1983 action “may well not be 
susceptible of a uniform answer across the entire spectrum” of constitutional 
violations for which the statute provides redress). 
 50. See id. at 534–35 (comparing § 1983 to a criminal counterpart that 
requires a defendant to act “willfully” and concluding that the differences between 
the two statutes suggests that a state-of-mind “gloss” should not be imposed on 
the former). 
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underlying violation.51 Because it affords a civil remedy, the 
requisite state of mind is generally found in the realm of tort law,52 
and—most importantly—it varies with the particular right that 
the plaintiff claims has been violated.53 
An example may provide clarity about how a claim under 
§ 1983 works. Suppose that Cynthia is employed as a patrol officer 
for the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, where 
George, Sr., serves as the Chief of Police. In the course of her work, 
Cynthia divulges information about George, Jr., a serial burglar, 
to a detective at the South Bend Police Department. Cynthia 
knows that George, Jr., is the son of the police chief. 
The information given by Cynthia leads to George, Jr.’s arrest 
in South Bend. After pleading guilty and being sent to the Indiana 
State Prison, George, Jr., refuses to enter the cell to which he has 
been assigned. This leads to an altercation where Christian, a 
corrections officer, handcuffs George, Jr., and then punches him in 
the face, breaking his jaw. In his anger, George, Sr., transfers 
Cynthia to night shift duty. 
Cynthia and George, Jr., both sue under § 1983. They must 
both prove that the respective defendants were acting “under color 
of state law.”54 For Cynthia, this is George Sr.’s use of power over 
the Department’s employees entrusted to him by the city of 
Indianapolis. For George, Jr., this is Christian’s authority over 
prisoners granted by the State of Indiana. 
Once the “under color of state law” requirement is met, the 
plaintiffs’ claims will differ because they must each prove an 
underlying violation of federal law.55 Cynthia may pursue a claim 
 
 51. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (noting that 
proof of § 1983’s essential elements is insufficient without the presence of a 
requisite state of mind). 
 52. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535 (“Section 1983 should be read against the 
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural 
consequences of his actions.” (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961))). 
 53. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has plainly read into [the statute] a state of 
mind requirement specific to the particular federal right underlying a § 1983 
claim.”). 
 54. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (describing the “under 
color of state law” requirement for a valid Section 1983 claim). 
 55. See Williams, 474 U.S at 329–30 (describing Section 1983’s requirement 
that an underlying federal right has been violated). 
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alleging that George, Sr., violated her First Amendment right to 
free speech by retaliating against her for divulging information 
that led to his son’s arrest. This would require her to prove that 
her speech was a matter of public concern and the act of changing 
her hours was substantially based on that speech.56 
George, Jr., on the other hand, may claim that his right to be 
free from excessive force under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause was violated. Unlike Cynthia’s claim, this has 
nothing to do with the defendant’s reaction to his speech. Instead, 
he would have to prove that the Christian’s punch was applied 
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” and not “a good-faith 
effort to maintain or restore discipline.”57 
Although the plaintiffs both allege violations under § 1983, the 
only similarity between their claims is the requirement that the 
defendant acted while using authority granted by state law.58 
Other than that, their claims require completely different types of 
proof, as derived from the underlying violations of federal law the 
respective plaintiffs have alleged.59 With respect to the 
state-of-mind requirements, Cynthia must show that George Sr., 
placed substantial weight on her protected speech when making 
the decision to change her hours, while George, Jr., must prove 
that Christian maliciously and sadistically intended to harm 
him.60 Despite using the same statute to attach federal 
jurisdiction, the ultimate success of the plaintiffs’ respective claims 
hinges on different kinds of evidence. 
 
 56. See Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the 
elements required for a Section 1983 claim where the underlying federal right is 
the First Amendment’s right to free speech and the alleged violation is a 
retaliation to the plaintiff’s speech). 
 57. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (describing the key inquiry 
for a Section 1983 claim where the underlying federal right is the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishment” and the alleged 
violation is excessive force used against the plaintiff). 
 58. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (describing the “under 
color of state law” requirement of § 1983 claims). 
 59. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (describing § 1983’s 
requirement that a plaintiff prove a violation of an underlying federal right). 
 60. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (stating the state-of-mind 
requirements for the plaintiffs’ respective claims). 
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B. The Deliberate Indifference Standard 
Because the validity of a § 1983 claim depends on proving the 
deprivation of a discrete federal right,61 the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant’s state of mind was consistent 
with a violation of that right.62 This results in different culpability 
requirements for claims that come into court under § 1983 that 
allege different underlying violations of substantive federal law.63 
The separate standards have largely been identified by judicial 
precedent.64 
For a class of § 1983 claims brought by prisoners under the 
Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual 
punishments, the generally applicable state-of-mind standard is 
“deliberate indifference.”65 That is not to say every 
Eighth-Amendment claim must meet the standard.66 However, it 
encompasses a broad range of conduct including inadequate jail 
conditions, denial of medical care, failure to protect against inmate 
assault, and failure to prevent suicide.67 
Similar claims brought by pretrial detainees are subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, without 
 
 61. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text (discussing the 
requirements of a valid § 1983 claim). 
 62. See Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d at 1277 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s construction of § 1983). 
 63. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:  
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3:7 (4th ed. 2013) 
The relevance of the defendant’s state of mind depends on the nature 
of the constitutional violation. For example, the Supreme Court held 
that at least ‘deliberate indifference’ is necessary to make out an 
Eighth Amendment violation. It also held that intentional interception 
of lawyer-client by an informer or intentional use of the conversations 
must occur to make out a Sixth Amendment violation. 
 64. See id. § 3:2 (“Different Fourteenth Amendment violations (and hence 
Bill of Rights violations) require different states of mind, apparently because of 
the history and the language of the applicable constitutional provisions.”). 
 65. See id. § 3:28 (discussing the relevant state-of-mind standards required 
for convicted prisoners who bring § 1983 claims under the Eighth Amendment). 
 66. See id. (“[I]n prison security cases, including those involving the use of 
force by prison guards, malicious and sadistic intent is required for an Eighth 
Amendment violation, a more defendant-protective standard.”). 
 67. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (discussing various types of claims 
that may be brought under the Eighth Amendment). 
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regard to the provisions of the Eighth Amendment.68 However, 
federal courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard to 
pretrial detainees’ claims just as they have applied it to claims 
brought by convicted prisoners.69 While courts have offered a 
number of reasons for this application,70 they have done so without 
any express guidance from the Supreme Court.71 Although this 
Note argues the application has been in error, it is important to 
comprehend the background and mechanics of the deliberate 
indifference standard to see why the courts have missed the mark 
on this issue. 
1. The Formulation of Deliberate Indifference 
Claims requiring deliberate indifference are premised on the 
idea that contemporary society will not tolerate certain conduct by 
corrections officials when people under their care—who are 
essentially at their mercy—face some threat of harm.72 The initial 
formulation of the culpability requirement was made under the 
Eighth Amendment,73 which states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not 
 
 68. See id. § 8A.09(2) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment encompassed imposed 
upon persons convicted of a crime while general due-process principles under the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected jail arrestees awaiting trial.”). 
 69. See infra notes 95–133 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts’ 
justifications for applying standards formulated under the Eighth Amendment to 
claims that arise under due process). 
 70. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing judicial 
opinions in which Federal Courts of Appeals have extended the 
deliberate-indifference requirement to claims brought by pretrial detainees under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 71. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09(4)(a) (“Although its logical soundness 
is questionable, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have 
often applied the exacting standards of deliberate indifference (applicable to 
‘punishments’) to jail conditions.”). 
 72. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976) (“The infliction of such 
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of 
decency . . . codifying the common-law view that ‘it is but just that the public be 
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his 
liberty, care for himself.’” (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132, S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 
1926))). 
 73. See id. at 101 (“The gravamen of respondent’s [Section] 1983 complaint 
is that petitioners have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth”). 
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be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”74 The essential effect of this is that 
deliberate indifference is itself considered a punishment.75 To the 
author’s knowledge, the Supreme Court has not explicitly analyzed 
deliberate indifference under any other constitutional provision.76 
Being developed in an Eighth-Amendment vacuum,77 the 
culpability requirement has been tailored to meet the prohibition 
on “cruel and unusual punishments.”78 In line with modern 
standards of decency,79 this imposes a duty on prison officials to 
provide inmates with adequate necessities.80 To state a cause of 
action on the basis of an official’s failure in this respect, a plaintiff 
must provide subjective proof of the defendant’s state of mind.81 
The standard itself is essentially tied to the criminal-law definition 
of “recklessness,” where the defendant “must both be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”82 
As an example, suppose that Dwight, a corrections officer in 
Virginia, is tasked with finding an appropriate cell in which to 
place Jim, a large and violent inmate who becomes enraged 
whenever he hears any language spoken other than English. 
 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
 75. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428, U.S. 153, 173 (1976))). 
 76. Cf. infra notes 111–133 and accompanying text (discussing cases that 
acknowledged the lack of a clear indication by the Supreme Court). 
 77. See id. (showing the Supreme Court has only analyzed deliberate 
indifference under the Eighth Amendment). 
 78. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relationship between the subjective standard and the Eighth Amendment’s focus 
on “punishments”). 
 79. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103–05 (explaining modern standards of 
decency). 
 80. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (discussing the various 
acts and omissions that can constitute a deprivation of a person’s 
Eighth-Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment). 
 81. See id. at 837 (“We reject petitioner’s invitation to adopt an objective test 
for deliberate indifference.”). 
 82. See id. at 836–37 (“The criminal law, however, generally permits a 
finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he 
is aware.”). 
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Dwight ultimately places him in a cell with Oscar, an inmate who 
often speaks to himself Spanish. This leads to an altercation where 
Jim assaults Oscar, causing permanent injury. If Oscar wishes to 
file a claim under § 1983 on the basis that Dwight failed to provide 
him with a reasonable degree of safety, he must prove that the 
officer was deliberately indifferent.83 Oscar would have to 
adequately demonstrate two things to meet the standard. The first 
is that Dwight was aware of the facts suggesting that an assault 
could occur if both inmates were placed in the same cell.84 This 
might consist of Jim’s physical capability and violent disposition 
toward speakers of foreign languages, along with Oscar’s tendency 
to speak Spanish. The second requirement is that Dwight made 
the proper inference based on those facts—that there was a serious 
risk of Jim violently assaulting Oscar.85 
When the Supreme Court initially held that subjective 
awareness was the proper inquiry, it was faced with the possibility 
of using a standard of recklessness derived from private civil law.86 
This is because the definition of recklessness varies depending on 
which area of the law is being discussed.87 If a civil-law standard 
is used, a plaintiff would be able to prove a sufficiently culpable 
state of mind on a purely objective set of facts.88 
The reason the Court used the subjective standard derived 
from criminal law lies in the connection between the type of claim 
and the federal law from which it was derived.89 Section 1983 does 
not create a cause of action, but merely serves as a vehicle through 
which a plaintiff may claim a violation of some federally-granted 
 
 83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (identifying deliberate 
indifference as the appropriate state-of-mind required for a prisoner’s claim that 
state actors failed to provide him with reasonable safety). 
 84. See Brennan, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (stating the first requirement of the 
deliberate indifference inquiry). 
 85. See id. (stating the second requirement of the deliberate indifference 
inquiry). 
 86. See id. (discussing the parties’ arguments for the proper state-of-mind 
inquiry). 
 87. See id. (finding that the term recklessness “is not self-defining”). 
 88. See id. at 836 (“The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts 
or (if a person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high 
risk of harm that is either known or is so obvious that it should be known.”). 
 89. See id. (contrasting different definitions of “recklessness”). 
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right, privilege, or immunity.90 For deliberate indifference, the 
underlying federal law is the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishments.91 The operative term here is 
“punishments,” as the amendment does not outlaw cruel and 
unusual “conditions.”92 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, a “cruel 
and unusual punishment” is equated with “an unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.”93 This definition requires a subjective 
inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind because it “isolates those 
who inflict punishment.”94 
2. The Application of Deliberate Indifference to the Claims of 
Pretrial Detainees 
Despite a lack of discussion by the Supreme Court,95 lower 
courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard to pretrial 
detainees’ claims.96 Unlike prisoners, pretrial detainees rely on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process rather than on 
the Eighth Amendment.97 Despite this discrepancy, lower courts 
 
 90. See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural 
nature of § 1983). 
 91. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 92. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (discussing the scope of 
Eighth Amendment violations). 
 93. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–300 (1991) (“It is obduracy and 
wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct 
prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. . . .” (quoting Whitley 
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))) (emphasis in original). 
 94. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–40. 
[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, 
and he must also draw the inference. This approach comports 
best with the text of the Amendment as our cases have 
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel 
and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual 
“punishments.” 
 95. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (holding that “prisoner’s pro se 
complaint . . . was insufficient to state a cause of action”). 
 96. See infra notes 99–133 and accompanying text (discussing lower-court 
opinions applying deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims). 
 97. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing authority 
acknowledging the correct constitutional provision under which pretrial 
detainees may bring a claim). 
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have frequently used Eighth-Amendment standards to govern 
their claims.98 The following sections provide an overview of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and lower courts’ 
reasoning in applying deliberate indifference to claims that fall 
under it. 
a. The Fourteenth Amendment as an Underlying Federal Right 
As previously discussed, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is merely a “vehicle” 
that a plaintiff must attach to some underlying federal right, 
immunity, or privilege in order to make a claim against a state 
actor.99 When pretrial detainees allege conduct that would 
otherwise be categorized as “deliberate indifference” under the 
Eighth Amendment, the applicable federal law is the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 This states that “[n]o 
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”101 
Unlike that of the Eighth Amendment, the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not restrained to conduct that is 
characterized as “punishment.”102 Instead, the scope of 
Fourteenth-Amendment due process is broadly focused on the 
deprivation of rights, encompassing conduct that “is not rationally 
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or 
where it “appear[s] excessive in relation to that purpose.”103 
 
 
 98. See infra notes 99–133 and accompanying text (discussing authority). 
 99. See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text (discussing the statute’s 
procedural nature). 
 100. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1437–39 (9th Cir. 
1991) (discussing the application of deliberate indifference to a due-process 
claim). 
 101. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 102. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (rejecting any 
requirement “that proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required for a pretrial 
detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were violated.”).  
 103. See id. at 397–98 (comparing the standards of the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause). 
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b. Justifications for Applying Deliberate Indifference Under Due 
Process 
Various lower courts have applied the Eighth-Amendment 
standard—as formulated by the Supreme Court in the context of 
prisoners’ claims—to pretrial detainees’ claims of deprivation 
under the Due Process Clause.104 Although justifications for this 
borrowing exercise vary between the federal circuits, they fall into 
two general categories.105 The first is concerned with the 
similarities between the two amendments, at least with respect to 
the protections they provide to the two classes of plaintiffs and the 
types of claims that those plaintiffs bring.106 The second focuses on 
the factual issues that courts would purportedly face if pretrial 
detainees and prisoners required conflicting treatment for similar 
claims.107 
(1) Similarities Between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
One general group of justifications proffered by federal courts 
for applying the Eighth-Amendment standard is premised on 
comparisons between the protections offered by the two 
constitutional provisions.108 Specifically, the courts have focused 
on either the amendments’ mutual requirement of “evolving 
standards,”109 or on the basis that the Eighth Amendment’s 
protections act as a “floor” when determining the securities offered 
by the Fourteenth.110 
 
 104. See infra notes 108–153 and accompanying text (providing an overview 
of authority). 
 105. See infra notes 108–153 and accompanying text (introducing 
justifications for applying deliberate indifference). 
 106. See infra notes 108–122 and accompanying text (providing an overview 
of decisions basing their reasoning on the similarities between the two 
amendments). 
 107. See infra notes 123–153 and accompanying text (discussing a decision 
applying deliberate indifference due to deferential treatment for corrections 
officials). 
 108. See infra notes 111–159 and accompanying text (discussing a Seventh 
Circuit opinion). 
 109. See infra notes 111–154 and accompanying text (discussing a Ninth 
Circuit opinion). 
 110. See infra notes 118–159 and accompanying text (discussing an Eleventh 
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In 1991, the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal of a pretrial 
detainee who had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate while 
incarcerated.111 He argued that his claim under § 1983 satisfied 
the requirement of an underlying constitutional violation because 
jail officials had violated his liberty interest in personal security, 
which fell under due process.112 In evaluating his claim, the court 
applied the Eighth Amendment standard, while acknowledging 
that the claim itself fell under the Fourteenth Amendment.113 
The court reasoned that this was appropriate because “the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, like the [E]ighth [A]mendment, must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”114 This proposition was 
made in reference to language used by the Supreme Court.115 
However, in the precedential opinion, the Court was only referring 
to the acceptability of punishment under the Eighth Amendment, 
with no mention of the Fourteenth.116 To eliminate this distinction, 
the Ninth Circuit cited similar language in another Supreme Court 
case, where the reference was to the Fourteenth Amendment.117  
The Seventh Circuit’s use of the Eighth-Amendment standard 
also involved a comparison to the Fourteenth, albeit with a slightly 
different focus.118 In a case involving the attempted suicide of a 
 
Circuit opinion). 
 111. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1437–39 (9th Cir. 
1991) (describing the facts and procedural history of the case). 
 112. See id. at 1439 (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s claim). 
 113. See id. at 1441 (discussing the proper analysis under a claim requiring 
deliberate indifference). 
 114. See id. (discussing the similar interests driving the analyses of the two 
amendments). 
 115. See id. (stating the standard under which “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain” is tied to). 
 116. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (“The basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While 
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this 
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”). 
 117. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he due process clause is not violated so long as the government conduct is not 
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471–72 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
 118. Compare infra notes 119–156 and accompanying text (outlining the 
Eighth Circuit approach), with Redman, 942 F.2d at 1437–39 (describing the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach). 
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pretrial detainee, the Court applied deliberate indifference 
because pretrial detainees’ due process rights “are at least as great 
as the Eighth Amendment protection available to a convicted 
prisoner.”119 This proposition also referenced an opinion of the 
Supreme Court.120 The precedent, however, was not discussing 
tests used to determine liability.121 It was simply discussing the 
requirement that state actors obtain medical care for persons 
injured while being apprehended.122 
(2) Factual Considerations 
Another justification proffered by courts in applying the 
Eighth-Amendment standard is based on practical concerns.123 
Essentially, the application of different standards would require 
courts to afford different protections to plaintiffs who have been 
held under identical conditions.124 
In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal of George 
Hamm, who was challenging the constitutionality of various 
conditions at the DeKalb County, Georgia jail.125 His claims arose 
during two different time periods.126 During the first, he was yet to 
 
 119. See Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the 
Eighth Amendment standard should apply despite the fact that “pre-trial 
detainees cannot be punished because they have not yet been found guilty . . .”). 
 120. See id. (citing Supreme Court precedents that hold the rights of pretrial 
detainees to be at least as great as those of a convicted prisoner). 
 121. See Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244–45 (1983) (“We need 
not define, in this case, Revere’s due process obligation to pretrial detainees or to 
other persons in its care who require medical attention.”). 
 122. See id. (“Whatever the standard may be, Revere fulfilled its 
constitutional obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken promptly to a hospital 
that provided the treatment necessary for his injury.”). 
 123. See infra notes 131–168 and accompanying text (stating that courts 
would essentially have to split hairs, depending on the status of the plaintiff). 
 124. See infra notes 131–168 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit). 
 125. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(“[Hamm] alleged that the jail was overcrowded, that the conditions were 
unsanitary, that the food service was unsanitary, and that the medical care was 
inadequate.”). 
 126. See id. (“The parties agree that the periods of incarceration pertinent to 
this appeal are February 11, 1980 to April 14, 1980 and September 23, 1980 to 
May 20, 1981. These periods of incarceration include periods both before and after 
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be convicted and thus was afforded the status of pretrial 
detainee.127 During the second period, he was being held 
post-conviction, shifting his status to that of a prisoner.128 Because 
of this context, the Court grappled with the possibility that the 
analyses of his claims could differ because one was under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, while the other was under the Eighth.129 
This was further complicated by an earlier Supreme Court decision 
that had made it clear that conduct that amounts to “punishment” 
is a violation of a detainee’s due process guarantees—a clear 
difference from the constitutional permissibility for conduct 
alleged by prisoners.130 
Ultimately, the Court decided that there should be no 
difference between the analyses of the two amendments.131 The 
conclusion was premised on the reality that many facilities hold 
both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, such as the DeKalb 
County Jail.132 By requiring different standards, courts would 
essentially have to split hairs between claims, depending on the 
status of the plaintiff.133 
 
Hamm’s conviction.”). 
 127. See id. at 1572 (discussing Hamm’s status before his conviction). 
 128. See id. (“The eighth amendment, however, applies only to confinement 
that occurs subsequent to and as a consequence of a person’s lawful conviction of 
a crime.”). 
 129. See id. (“Since the conditions about which Hamm complains in this case 
were imposed on him both before and after his conviction . . . this court must 
determine the extent to which [Eighth Amendment] standards differ—if any—
from due process standards.”). 
 130. See id. at 1572–73 (“The due process clause affords pretrial detainees 
rights not enjoyed by convicted inmates.” (quoting Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 
1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). 
 131. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The 
court recognizes that the limitations imposed by the eighth amendment and the 
due process clause arise in different contexts. Nonetheless, with respect to the 
provision of basic necessities to individuals in the state’s custody, the two 
provisions necessarily yield the same result.”). 
 132. See id. (discussing the practical implications of using two different 
standards). 
 133. See id. (“That approach would result in the courts’ becoming enmeshed 
in the minutiae of prison operations, a situation against which the Supreme Court 
has warned.”). 
GIVING DUE PROCESS ITS DUE 671 
III. The Effect of Kingsley v. Hendrickson 
In 2015 the Supreme Court made it clear that 
Eighth-Amendment standards do not necessarily apply to pretrial 
detainees’ claims.134 The decision itself was not concerned with a 
conditions-of-confinement claim.135 However, some federal courts 
have viewed the reasoning in that opinion as being equally 
applicable to those claims.136 As a result, they have eliminated 
deliberate indifference as a requirement for pretrial detainees and 
replaced it with an objective standard.137 Other courts have 
declined to extend the reasoning, creating a split among the federal 
circuits.138 This Part discusses the reasoning that led to the 
Supreme Court’s decision and the resulting disagreement among 
some federal Courts of Appeals.  
A. Kingsley v. Hendrickson 
In 2015 the Supreme Court heard the appeal of a pretrial 
detainee’s excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.139 The 
question presented was whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process requires a plaintiff to prove that 
corrections officers “were subjectively aware that their use of force 
[against the plaintiff] was unreasonable, or only that the officers’ 
use of force was objectively unreasonable.”140 The Court held in 
 
 134. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (contrasting 
claims on the basis of the underlying federal rights that apply). 
 135. See id. at 395 (“Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking us to 
determine whether the requirements of a § 1983 excessive force claim brought by 
a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective standard or only the objective 
standard.”). 
 136. See infra notes 175–238 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that 
see the reasoning in Kingsley as generally applicable to pretrial detainees’ 
claims). 
 137. See infra notes 175–238 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that 
have applied an objective unreasonableness standard to pretrial detainees’ 
conditions-of-confinement claims). 
 138. See infra notes 232–264 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that 
have narrowly defined Kingsley’s reasoning). 
 139. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391 (2015) (providing the 
procedural posture of the case and framing the question before the Court). 
 140. Id. 
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favor of the plaintiff, finding that “objective unreasonableness” was 
the appropriate standard for determining whether the force used 
pierced the constitutional threshold of excessiveness.141 
An excessive force claim is not the same thing as a claim 
requiring a showing of deliberate indifference—the focus of this 
Note—even though they both apply to pretrial detainees.142 
Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning has major implications for the 
blind application of Eighth-Amendment doctrine to claims brought 
under the Fourteenth.143 
1. Background 
In April 2010, Michael Kingsley was arrested and booked into 
the Monroe County Jail in Sparta, Wisconsin.144 At some point 
during his time in custody, Kingsley was transferred to a cell 
where a prior occupant had affixed a piece of paper to a light in 
order to dim its brightness.145 On the evening of May 20 and in the 
early morning of May 21, officers at the jail ordered him to remove 
the paper from the light.146 Kingsley refused to remove the paper 
because he had not placed it there.147 
 
 141. See id. at 396 (“In deciding whether the force used is, constitutionally 
speaking, ‘excessive,’ should courts use an objective standard only, or instead a 
subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind? It is with 
respect to this question that we must hold that courts must use an objective 
standard.”). 
 142. Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989) (referring to the 
type of violation alleged in a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim as 
“physically abusive government conduct”), with Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 
1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applies to 
claims that corrections facility officials failed to address the medical needs of 
pretrial detainees.” (quoting Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 
1242 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1060 
(9th Cir. 2016))). 
 143. See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text (discussing a circuit 
split). 
 144. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) 
(No. 14–6368) (“[Kingsley] was being detained pending trial at the time of the 
incident that rise to his excessive force claim.”). 
 145. See id. at 4 n.2 (“[T]he paper in his cell was already there when he was 
transferred to that cell about a month earlier. As the court below noted, inmates 
cover the light with paper to dim the brightness of the light.”). 
 146. See id. at 4 (summarizing the events that led to litigation). 
 147. See id. (explaining the officers’ reasoning for moving Mr. Kingsley from 
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The officers entered Kingsley’s cell and placed him in 
handcuffs before roughly moving him to a receiving cell “so that 
jail staff could remove the paper.”148 Although the parties disputed 
the exact events that occurred in the receiving cell, it is undeniable 
that a senior officer directed another to use a taser on Kingsley, 
who was lying “face down on a cement bunk with his hands still 
cuffed behind his back.”149 After applying the taser for 
approximately five seconds, the officers left without removing the 
handcuffs.150 
Kingsley filed an action in the district court under § 1983, 
claiming that the officers had used excessive force against him in 
violation of his Fourteenth-Amendment right to due process as a 
pretrial detainee.151 Ultimately, a jury found in favor of the 
defendants.152 Kingsley took issue with the jury instructions and 
appealed his case to the Seventh Circuit.153 
 
his cell). 
 148. See id. 
To accomplish [the transfer], the officers first entered Mr. Kingsley’s 
cell and handcuffed him behind his back while he was lying face down 
on his bunk. Mr. Kingsley testified that the handcuffs were extremely 
tight. During the transfer, the officers banged Mr. Kingsley’s leg 
against the bunk in picking him up, causing pain in his foot and 
making it difficult for him to walk. The officers then carried Mr. 
Kingsley from to original cell to the receiving cell. 
 149. See id. at 5 (stating that Sergeant Hendrickson, a named party in the 
ensuing litigation, “placed his knee on Mr. Kingsley’s back” while he was “face 
down on a cement bunk with his hands still cuffed behind his back.”). 
 150. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 5 (“Other officers were later 
able to remove Mr. Kingsley’s handcuffs without incident.”). 
 151. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 393 (2015) (stating that the 
claim proceeded to trial after the district court denied the officers’ motion for 
summary judgment because “a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers 
acted with malice and intended to harm Kingsley when they used excessive force 
against him.” (quoting Kingsley v. Josvai, No. 10–cv–832–bbc, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 158769, at *18 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 16, 2011), aff’d 744 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 
2014), rev’d 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015))). 
 152.  Id. at 394. 
 153. See id. (summarizing the events that led to Kingsley’s appeal); see also 
Joint Appendix at 278, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), for the jury 
instructions used in the district court, which state in pertinent part: 
In deciding whether one or more of the defendants used “unreasonable” 
force against the plaintiff, you must consider whether it was 
unreasonable harm from the perspective of a reasonable officer facing 
the same circumstances that defendants faced. You must base the 
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His argument was based on the jury instructions’ requirement 
that liability could only be found if the defendants had actual 
knowledge that their conduct created an unnecessary risk of harm 
to the plaintiff.154 A majority of the court of appeals panel, however, 
found that liability required a “subjective inquiry into the officer’s 
state of mind.”155 Still in disagreement with this legal standard, 
Kingsley petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the Supreme 
Court.156 
2. The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
In a majority opinion authored by Stephen Breyer, the 
Supreme Court agreed with Kingsley’s contention that a subjective 
standard is inappropriate for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force 
claim.157 Though constitutional claims for excessive force differ 
from those for deliberate indifference,158 the reasons for which the 
Court arrived at its conclusion create implications for both.159 
 
decision based on what the defendants knew at the time of the incident, 
not based on what you know now. 
(emphasis added). 
 154. See id. (“On appeal, Kingsley argued that the correct standard for 
judging a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is objective 
unreasonableness.”). 
 155. See id. (stating that the majority panel found that “[t]here must be an 
actual intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights or reckless disregard for his rights.” 
(quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d 576 
U.S. 389 (2015))). 
 156. See id. at 395 (stating that the petition for certiorari was granted “in 
light of disagreement among the Circuits.”). 
 157. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 395 (2015) (“We conclude 
with respect to that question that the appropriate standard is objective not 
subjective. Thus, the defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that the plaintiff 
is required to prove.”). 
 158. Compare Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 2014) (“A 
claim of excessive force, like the one at issue here, is, at bottom, one that seeks to 
impose liability for physically abusive government conduct.”), rev’d 576 U.S. 389 
(2015), with Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 
2017) (per curiam) (applying the deliberate indifference standard where a pretrial 
detainee alleged that corrections officials “provided him inadequate security and 
impermissibly delayed medical care”). 
 159. See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text (discussing a circuit 
split). 
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Justice Breyer began by framing the “state of mind issue” in 
dispute between the parties.160 While there was no dispute over the 
defendants’ volition with respect to their physical acts, the proper 
inquiry on appeal was into their recognition of whether or not those 
acts were “excessive.”161 In determining the appropriate question, 
Justice Breyer made it clear that negligence—an impermissible 
standard for substantive due process claims—is inapplicable only 
with respect to the defendants’ volitional acts, not their 
interpretation of the acts’ consequences.162 
After quickly concluding that objective unreasonableness is a 
permissible standard for judging a defendant’s state of mind, 
Breyer noted that the application was partly due to the 
constitutional differences between convicted prisoners and pretrial 
detainees.163 The defendants argued that precedent supported the 
position that some form of intent was required for § 1983 
liability.164 Breyer reminded them, however, that the authority 
cited concerned litigation brought by convicted prisoners.165 Where 
the Eighth Amendment is placed as the substantive anchor of a 
 
 160. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395 (“We consider a legally requisite state of 
mind. In a case like this one, there are, in a sense, two separate state-of-mind 
questions.”). 
 161. See id. at 396 
[T]he officers do not dispute that they acted purposefully or knowingly 
with respect to the force they used against Kingsley. We now consider 
the question before us here—the defendant’s state of mind with respect 
to the proper interpretation of the force (a series of events in the world) 
that the defendant deliberately (not accidently or negligently) used. In 
deciding whether the force used is, constitutionally speaking, 
“excessive,” should courts use an objective standard only, or instead a 
subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of 
mind? 
 162. See id. (“Thus, if an officer’s Taser goes off by accident or if an officer 
unintentionally trips and falls on a detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial 
detainee cannot prevail on an excessive force claim.”). 
 163. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (drawing a 
distinction between the respective positions that pretrial detainees and convicted 
prisoners stand in). 
 164. See id. at 400 (“Respondents believe that the relevant legal standard 
should be subjective, i.e., that the plaintiff must prove that the use of force . . . was 
applied ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”). 
 165. See id. (“The first of these two of these cases, however, concern excessive 
force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause, not claims brought by pretrial detainees under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). 
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§ 1983 claim, constitutionally impermissible punishment is a 
required element of the claim.166 
Unlike prisoners, pretrial detainees’ claims are not premised 
on whether or not they were unconstitutionally punished.167 “The 
language of the two clauses differs, and the nature of the claims 
often differs.”168 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, detainees 
“cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and 
sadistically.”169 Therefore, the element of intent that is inherently 
required for claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause does not apply to pretrial detainees’ Due Process claims.170  
B. The Consequences of Kingsley v. Hendrickson 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was limited to pretrial 
detainees’ excessive force claims,171 the case has presented a 
substantial issue for lower courts to consider.172 At its most basic 
distillation, the question seems simple enough:  Should a purely 
objective analysis into a corrections official’s state of mind be 
confined only to excessive force claims, or should it apply to a 
broader range of claims brought by pretrial detainees under the 
Fourteenth Amendment?173 Courts have come down on both sides 
 
 166. See id. at 401 (“Thus, there is no need here, as there might be in an 
Eighth Amendment case, to determine when punishment is unconstitutional.”). 
 167. See id. (explaining the inherent differences between the 
Fourteenth-Amendment claims of pretrial detainees and the Eight-Amendment 
claims of convicted prisoners). 
 168. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015). 
 169. See id. (“If the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is 
committed to the county jail[,] but only for safe custody, and not for punishment.” 
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298, *300)). 
 170. See id. (“And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted 
prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.” 
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72, n.40 (1977))). 
 171. See id. at 402 (“We acknowledge that our view that an objective standard 
is appropriate in the context of excessive force claims brought by pretrial 
detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 172. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing lower courts’ treatment of the issue). 
 173. See id. (“Kingsley did not squarely address the objective standard applies 
to all kinds of claims brought by pretrial detainees, including both excessive force 
claims and failure-to-protect claims.”). 
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of the issue.174 This subpart provides an overview of the split by 
discussing individual cases. Those that have expanded Kingsley’s 
application will be considered first, followed by opinions that have 
confined Kingsley’s reach to excessive-force claims.  
1. Expanding Kingsley to a Broader Range of Claims 
a. The Second Circuit 
In 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of 
twenty pretrial detainees who brought an action alleging that the 
City of New York, the New York Police Department, and individual 
officers had subjected them to “appalling conditions of 
confinement” at Brooklyn Central Booking.175 The issue was 
whether the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs could not 
establish the “subjective prong” of a deliberate indifference 
analysis.176 The court noted that its own precedent had settled on 
applying only a subjective standard.177 However, it also recognized 
that the use of a subjective requirement was no longer on steady 
ground in light of Kingsley and questioned whether a purely 
objective requirement is the proper standard.178 
The court began its analysis by noting that, despite what the 
term itself may suggest, “deliberate indifference” is not inherently 
 
 174. Compare infra notes 175–231 and accompanying text (extending the 
application to a broader range of pretrial detainees’ due process claims), with 
infra notes 232–257 and accompanying text (declining to extend the application 
beyond pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims). 
 175. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2017) (“This is a case 
about unconstitutional conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees.”). 
 176. See id. at 20–21 (“[N]or could any plaintiff establish that . . . the 
individual defendants were actually aware of any dangerous conditions, or that 
the individual defendants acted unreasonably in responding to any such 
conditions; nor, for similar reasons, could the plaintiffs establish that the 
individual defendants acted with punitive intent.”). 
 177. See id. at 33 (discussing the resolution of an intra-circuit divergence with 
respect to the treatment of the deliberate indifference standard). 
 178. See id. at 21 (“The District Court did not analyze the implications of 
Kingsley in its opinion . . . [t]his case also requires us to consider whether 
Kingsley altered the standard for conditions of confinement claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). 
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a standard that requires some subjective inquiry.179 Because its 
definition is somewhat flexible, deliberate indifference requires a 
general state-of-mind inquiry, but there is no need for the inquiry 
to be subjective.180 This interpretation was strengthened by 
recognizing that Supreme Court precedent demanding a subjective 
inquiry came under the Eighth Amendment, where “punishment 
connotes a subjective intent on the part of the official.”181 
The court further distanced the doctrine of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by looking to the language of Kingsley.182 
Noting that “pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all, much 
less ‘maliciously and sadistically,” it found no basis in its prior 
opinions supporting the conclusion that deliberate indifference 
should apply equally to claims under both amendments.183 Instead, 
the court found that the deliberate indifference analysis only 
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant objectively failed 
to appreciate the risks that led to the plaintiff’s injury.184 While the 
defendants argued that this would result in a dramatic increase in 
litigation, the court noted that its previous decision to do away 
with the objective standard was premised on consistency with the 
Supreme Court, not on considerations of judicial efficiency.185 
 
 179. See id. at 29 (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘deliberate 
indifference’ roughly means ‘recklessness,’ but ‘recklessness’ can be defined 
subjectively (what a person actually knew, or disregarded), or objectively (what a 
reasonable person knew, or should have known).” (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994))). 
 180. See id. at 32 (“As such, the ‘subjective prong’ might better be described 
as the ‘mens rea prong’, or ‘mental element prong.”). 
 181. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32–33 (“The Supreme Court based its holding 
on a close reading of the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 
which outlaws ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ not ‘cruel and unusual 
conditions.” (emphasis added) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 
(1994)). 
 182. See id. at 33–34 (revisiting the rationale in Kingsley). 
 183. See id. at 34–35 
Unlike a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, an 
official can violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment without meting out any punishment, which means that 
the Due Process Clause can be violated when an official does not have 
subjective awareness that the official’s acts (or omissions) have 
subjected the pretrial detainee to a substantial risk of harm. 
 184. See id. at 34 (“In other words, the ‘subjective prong’ (or ‘mens rea prong’) 
of a deliberate indifference claim is defined objectively.”). 
 185. See id. at 36 (stating that the initial decision to use an objective standard 
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b. The Seventh Circuit 
In 2012, Lyvita Gomes died under the care of corrections staff 
in Lake County, Illinois.186 Before passing away, Gomes refused to 
eat or drink while “[t]he medical providers who worked at the Jail 
did little other than monitoring as she wasted away in her cell.”187 
The personal representative of her estate brought an action 
against Correct Care Solutions, a contractor providing medical 
services to the jail’s population.188 The claim theorized that the 
decision to monitor Gomes in lieu of transporting her to a hospital 
constituted inadequate medical care with deliberate 
indifference.189 Upon motion by the defendants, the district court 
granted judgment as a matter of law on the constitutional 
claims.190 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit discussed the proper 
application of deliberate indifference to claims of inadequate 
medical care.191 Authority within the circuit required a showing 
that the defendant actually believed that the plaintiff was faced 
with a significant risk of harm.192 However, the court 
acknowledged that this was decided without any analysis of the 
differences that exist between pretrial detainees and convicted 
prisoners.193 
 
was not “because of any concerns that an objective standard would prompt the 
filing of non-meritorious claims”). 
 186. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The 
autopsy opined that she died of Complications of Dehydration and Starvation. 
The manner of death was suicide.”). 
 187. See id. at 341–42 (describing the acts and omissions taken by jail staff 
and medical providers who oversaw the care of Ms. Gomes during her 
incarceration). 
 188. See id. at 341 (summarizing the litigation that led to the appeal in the 
Seventh Circuit). 
 189. See id. 346–47 (identifying two physicians as defendants to the estate’s 
due process claim). 
 190. See id. at 343 (“The court also concluded that the Estate had failed to 
present enough evidence to reach the jury on the question of whether the medical 
defendants causes Gomes’s death . . . .”). 
 191. See id. at 350–51 (analyzing the “intent” requirement for claims of 
deliberate indifference). 
 192. See id. at 351 (“This subjective standard is closely linked to the language 
of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”). 
 193. See id. at 350–51 (“In conducting this borrowing exercise, we have 
grafted the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference requirement onto the 
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The court emphasized that Kingsley v. Hendrickson was 
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.194 It noted that the 
Supreme Court’s decision rested on that fact, especially with 
regard to the “punishment” issue.195 While prisoners have a right 
to be free from “cruel and unusual punishment,” detainees have a 
right to be free from punishment generally.196 Acts that constitute 
“punishment” of pretrial detainees may include that of the “cruel 
and unusual” variety, which requires “an express intent to 
punish.”197 Although this calls for a subjective inquiry, it is only 
one area within a broader range of conduct considered punishment 
when pretrial detainees are involved.198 
Kingsley’s definition of punishment in the pretrial context led 
the court to “call into question” its practice of “treating the 
protections afforded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
as ‘functionally indistinguishable’ in the context of a claim about 
inadequate medical care.”199 Noting that “the Supreme Court has 
been signaling that courts must pay careful attention to the 
different status of pretrial detainees” in opinions other than 
Kingsley, the court found no valid reason for confining the 
elimination of a subjective standard only to excessive-force 
claims.200 Consequently, the court concluded that “objective 
 
pretrial detainee’s situation.”). 
 194. See id. at 351 (“Kingsley, it is worth emphasizing, was a Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process case. Indeed, the Court took pains to reiterate the basic 
principles that apply to pretrial detainees . . . .”). 
 195. See id. (discussing the Majority opinion in Kingsley v. Hendrickson). 
 196. See id. (noting that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee 
from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment” (quoting Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989))). 
 197. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of “punishment” by 
government actors in the pretrial context). 
 198. See id. (“[I]n the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial 
detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally 
related to a legitimate nonpunitive government purpose’ or that the actions 
‘appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979))). 
 199. See id. at 352 (discussing the grafting of Eighth Amendment principles 
to claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment within the Seventh Circuit 
and among other federal Courts of Appeal) (quoting Smego v. Jumper, 707 F. 
App’x 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2017))). 
 200. See id. (“We see nothing in the logic the Supreme Court used in Kingsley 
that would support this kind of dissection of the different types of claims that 
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). 
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unreasonableness” is the proper state-of-mind requirement for 
pretrial detainees’ inadequate medical care claims.201 
c. The Ninth Circuit 
In 2009, Jonathan Castro was arrested for public drunkenness 
and transported to a police station in West Hollywood, 
California.202 There, he was placed in a sobering cell designed “to 
allow maximum visual supervision” by corrections staff.203 
Sometime later, Jonathan Gonzalez was arrested and placed into 
the cell with Castro.204 During his arrest and intake, Gonzalez was 
described as “combative” and his behavior characterized as 
“bizarre.”205 Despite a California law calling for jail staff to 
maintain “maximum visual supervision” of “inmates requiring 
more than minimum security,” vision into the cell was partially 
blocked, and the detainees were supervised by an unpaid 
volunteer.206 
Castro pounded on the cell’s window shortly after Gonzalez 
entered, but the volunteer did not check on them for another 
twenty minutes.207 Upon observing Gonzalez “inappropriately 
touching Castro’s thigh,” the volunteer did not enter to 
investigate.208 Instead, he reported to the station’s supervising 
officer, who arrived six minutes later to witness Gonzalez violently 
 
 201. See id. (stating the appropriate state-of-mind requirement for 
inadequate medical care claims and identifying other federal courts that have 
used the same application). 
 202. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc) (describing the circumstances of Castro’s arrest). 
 203. See id. at 1065 (describing a “sobering cell” as “a fully walled chamber 
that was stripped of objects with hard edges on which an inmate could hurt 
himself; the cell contained only a toilet and some mattress pads”). 
 204. See id. (“[A]uthorities arrested Gonzalez on a felony charge after he 
shattered a glass door with his fist at a nightclub.”). 
 205. See id. (describing the account of Gonzalez’s arrival at the West 
Hollywood station as recorded on an intake form). 
 206. See id. (“The sobering cell met neither of these requirements, yet it was 
used routinely.”). 
 207. See id. (describing the events that led to Castro’s injury). 
 208. See id. (noting that “Castro appeared to be asleep” and that Gonzalez’s 
action was “in violation of jail policy”). 
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stomping on Castro’s head.209 After the incident, Castro was 
hospitalized for nearly a month and required care in a long-term 
facility for four years.210 “He suffers from severe memory loss and 
other cognitive difficulties.”211 
Castro filed multiple claims against Los Angeles County, the 
Sheriff’s Department, and individual defendants.212 Among these 
was a failure-to-protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which required a showing of deliberate indifference.213 After a jury 
returned a verdict favorable to Castro, the defendants appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit on the basis that this conclusion was not 
reasonable in light of the evidence presented.214 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, tackled the deliberate 
indifference analysis by first noting that its precedent, requiring a 
subjective inquiry, was premised on an interpretation of Supreme 
Court opinions that seemed to suggest that “punitive intent” is a 
requirement the plaintiff must prove.215 The court then quickly 
discussed the impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson before concluding 
that the decision directly contradicted its prior treatment of the 
issue.216 However, it also recognized that the Supreme Court was 
 
 209. See id. (stating that the station supervisor “found Castro lying 
unconscious in a pool of blood”). 
 210. See id. (“When paramedics arrived, Castro was unconscious, in 
respiratory distress, and blue.”). 
 211. See id. (describing the ongoing effects of Castro’s injuries). 
 212. See id. (“Castro claimed that both the entity defendants and the 
individual defendants violated his constitutional rights by housing him in the 
sobering cell with Gonzalez and by failing to maintain appropriate supervision of 
the cell.”). 
 213. See id. at 1067 (“[T]he Supreme Court made clear that ‘prison officials 
have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners’ 
because corrections officers ‘have stripped the inmates of virtually every means 
of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid.” (quoting Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994))). 
 214. See id. (“A three-judge panel affirmed the judgment of the district court 
as to the individual defendants but reversed as to the entity defendants. A 
majority of active non-recused judges voted to rehear the case en banc.”). 
 215. See id. at 1068 (“[W]e held that ‘an official’s failure to alleviate a 
significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for 
commendation, cannot be condemned as infliction of punishment,’ and so could 
not support liability under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” 
(quoting Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir. 2010), 
overruled by Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc))). 
 216. See id. at 1068–69 (“In sum, Kingsley rejected the notion that there exists 
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less than crystal clear as to whether the objective standard should 
be applied beyond excessive-force claims.217 
The court ultimately found ample support for expansion.218 
First, it noted that the “state-of-mind” requirement is not attached 
to the statute that allows the court to hear the action, but rather 
to the underlying federal right that the plaintiff claims has been 
violated.219 Whether a pretrial detainee brings an excessive-force 
claim or a failure-to-protect claim, the underlying federal right is 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.220 This, of course, 
differs from convicted prisoners, who rely on the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, which requires a subjective 
standard.221 
The court also noted that Kingsley’s choice of language 
supports a broader application of the objective standard.222 The 
Supreme Court could have stated that pretrial detainees can 
provide purely objective evidence of a defendant’s state of mind 
with respect to the level of force applied.223 Instead, it stated that 
such evidence can be brought with respect to a “challenged 
government action.”224 
After deciding that Kingsley’s state-of-mind requirement 
covers a broad range of claims, the court found that this includes 
 
a single ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applicable to all § 1983 claims, whether 
brought by pretrial detainees or by convicted prisoners.”). 
 217. See id. at 1069 (“An excessive force claim, like the one at issue in 
Kingsley, differs in some ways from a failure-to-protect claim, like the one at issue 
here.”). 
 218. See id. at 1069–70 (“On the other hand, there are significant reasons to 
hold that the objective standard applies to failure-to-protect claims as well.”). 
 219. See id. at 1069 (“Section 1983 itself contains no state-of-mind 
requirement independent of necessary to state a violation of the underlying 
federal right.” (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 
397, 405 (1997))). 
 220. See id. (discussing the relationship between different categories of claims 
that may be brought by pretrial detainees). 
 221. See id. at 1070 (“And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike 
convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less maliciously and 
sadistically.” (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015))). 
 222. See id. (“We note, too, the broad wording of Kingsley.”). 
 223. See id. (noting that Kingsley v. Hendrickson rejected the interpretation 
of precedent on which the Ninth Circuit previously relied). 
 224. See id. (“The Court did not limit its holding to force but spoke to the 
challenged government action generally.”). 
684 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 649 (2021) 
failure-to-protect claims.225 In applying the standard to these 
claims, the court proposed a concrete set of elements.226 The first 
two require that the defendant created a condition that subjected 
the detainee to a significant risk of harm.227 Like the decision to 
use force as described in Kingsley, this requires some measure of 
intent on the part of the defendant, and thus calls for a subjective 
inquiry.228 The third element requires that the defendant did not 
take any reasonably available measures to abate the risk 
created.229 Like the defendant’s cognizance of whether or not the 
force used was “excessive” in Kingsley, this may be decided from 
the view of a reasonable person.230 Therefore, the failure to abate 
the risk of harm may be demonstrated on the basis that it was 
objectively unreasonable.231 
2. Confining Kingsley to Excessive-Force Claims 
Three federal courts of appeals have decided that Kingsley’s 
application of an objective standard to excessive-force claims 
should not be expanded to claims requiring deliberate 
indifference.232 These courts’ actual consideration of Kingsley’s 
 
 225. See id. (“Excessive force applied directly by an individual jailer and force 
applied by a fellow inmate can cause the same injuries, both physical and 
constitutional.”). 
 226. See id. at 1071 (reciting the elements required for a pretrial detainee to 
prove a failure-to-protect claim). 
 227. See id. at 1070–71 (applying the principles of Kingsley v. Hendrickson to 
a failure-to-protect claim). 
 228. See id. (“In the failure-to-protect context, in which the issue is usually 
inaction rather than action, the equivalent is that the officer’s conduct with 
respect to the plaintiff was intentional.”). 
 229. See id. (“Was there a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff that 
could have been eliminated through reasonable and available measures that the 
officer did not take, thus causing the injury that the plaintiff suffered?”). 
 230. See id. at 1071 (“Thus, the test to be applied under Kingsley must require 
a pretrial detainee who asserts a due process claim for failure to protect to prove 
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless 
disregard.”). 
 231. See id. (“The defendant did not take reasonable measures to abate that 
risk, even though a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have 
appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the 
defendant’s conduct obvious . . . .”). 
 232. See infra notes 235–257 and accompanying text (discussing judicial 
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potential ramifications is perhaps best summarized by Judge Van 
Tatenhove of the Eastern District of Kentucky, who stated that 
“each of these cases contains a dearth of reasoning.”233 What little 
reasoning there is can be placed in two different categories, each 
to be considered in turn.234 
a. Kingsley Involved a Different Type of Conduct 
The first is not really a reason for cabining Kingsley to 
excessive-force claims so much as it is a simple assertion that it 
has been.235 In 2014, Norman Whitney, Jr., was placed in the 
medical unit of the St. Louis City Justice Center because he 
suffered from a number of serious medical conditions.236 In 
addition, Whitney, Jr., had pleaded with officers to kill him upon 
his initial arrest.237 Shelley Sharp, a corrections officer, was tasked 
with monitoring him on a closed-circuit television.238 During a 
fourteen-minute span where she failed to do so, Whitney, Jr., 
hanged himself.239 
Whitney’s father filed a § 1983 claim alleging that Sharp failed 
to adequately monitor his son.240 The district court dismissed the 
complaint and the case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit.241 
There, the court found “that the complaint fails to allege facts 
establishing the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference 
 
opinions that have rejected the notion that an objective standard should apply to 
a broader range of pretrial detainees’ due-process claims). 
 233. See Love v. Franklin Cnty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 740, 746 (E.D. Ky. 2019) 
(“Continued use of the subjective test in other circuits is similarly 
unpersuasive.”). 
 234. See infra notes 235–257 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons 
given for rejecting a broader application of Kingsley’s objective standard). 
 235. See Love, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 746 (dismissing the Eight Circuit’s opinion 
on Kingsley’s consequence to pretrial detainees deliberate-indifference claims as 
an “assertion without reason.”). 
 236. Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 237. See id. (“He was evaluated and determined to be suicidal.”). 
 238. See id. (explaining that his cell was monitored by closed-circuit 
television). 
 239. See id. (finding that the suicide occurred when Whitney Jr. was not being 
monitored). 
 240. See id. (bringing the charge in Missouri state court). 
 241. See id. at 859–60 (appealing two separate district court rulings). 
686 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 649 (2021) 
claim.”242 In a footnote it acknowledged Whitney, Sr.’s assertion 
that Kingsley called for the application of an objective standard.243 
The full response to this assertion was “Kingsley does not control 
because it was an excessive force case, not a deliberate indifference 
case.” 244 
b. Circuit Precedent 
The second reason offered for rejecting a broader application 
of Kingsley involves two circuits’ rules for rejecting their own 
precedent.245 The first case involved Nam Dang, a detainee who 
filed a suit for inadequate medical care after health care providers 
in the Seminole County, Florida jail failed to diagnose him with 
meningitis, despite his complaints of a headache and the presence 
of objectively identifiable symptoms.246 On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit noted that the application of an objective standard would 
not make the individual defendants liable because their conduct 
was merely negligent.247 
However, the court went even further by rejecting the 
application of Kingsley’s objective standard altogether, finding 
that this would be barred by its own precedent that adopted 
deliberate indifference.248 This was due to the court’s standard for 
disregarding its prior holdings upon an intermediary Supreme 
Court decision, which requires that the holding be “overruled.”249 
 
 242. See id. at 860 (“Our precedent establishes that whether an official was 
deliberately indifferent requires both an objective and a subjective analysis.”). 
 243. See id. at 860 n.4 (stating the Plaintiff’s argument against the use of a 
subjective standard). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See infra notes 246–257 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits’ analyses of Kingsley’s application to claims beyond the 
excessive-force context). 
 246. See Nam Dang v. Sherriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1276–78 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (establishing the circumstances that led to the appeal). 
 247. See id. at 1279 n.4 (“Kingsley itself notes that even when it comes to 
pretrial detainees, ‘liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath 
the threshold of constitutional due process.” (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015))). 
 248. See id. at 1279 n.2 (rejecting application of the Kingsley doctrine). 
 249. See United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the applicable standard where a party argues that a prior holding of 
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In the Eleventh Circuit, this only occurs where the Supreme 
Court’s decision is “squarely on point” and “actually abrogate[s] or 
directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to merely weaken[s],” the 
applicable standard.250 Here, the court found that its precedent 
was not overruled because Kingsley was an excessive-force claim, 
as opposed to the claim of inadequate medical treatment before 
it.251 
The Fifth Circuit applied somewhat similar reasoning in a 
case where Larry Alderson was placed with Louisiana Department 
of Corrections (DOC) inmates due to a misclassification by 
corrections staff, severely beaten and stabbed by some of them, and 
then left in the cell with other DOC inmates for an hour after a 
corrections officer came to document the incident with his camera 
phone.252 Despite agreeing with the court’s finding that Alderson 
had failed to properly state his claim, a concurring opinion noted 
that the Fifth Circuit should revisit its adherence to deliberate 
indifference as the applicable standard for pretrial detainees.253 
The majority responded by pointing to the Fifth Circuit’s “rule 
of orderliness.”254 This prevents a panel of the Court from declaring 
void a prior panel’s interpretation of the law, even when it appears 
to be flawed.255 The only way to overrule the earlier case is with a 
statutory amendment or a decision by either the Supreme Court or 
the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.256 The majority then cited Fifth 
 
the Eleventh Circuit is no longer good law). 
 250. See id. (“We would, of course, not only be authorized but also required to 
depart from our prior decision if an intervening Supreme Court decision actually 
overruled or conflicted with it.” (quoting Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 
1326 (11th Cir. 1998))). 
 251. See Nam Dang, 871 F.3d at 1279 n.4 (rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim that 
he need not demonstrate deliberate indifference). 
 252. See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 418–19 (5th 
Cir. 2017) (“When Alderson asked [corrections officer] Bryant for medications that 
he had been prescribed [following the incident] to prevent infection and alleviate 
the pain, Bryant told him ‘[m]an up & wait til [sic] medical staff returns from the 
Christmas holiday.”). 
 253. See id. at 424–25 (Graves, Jr., J., concurring) (“I write separately because 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson appears to call into 
question this court’s holding in Hare v. City of Corinth.”). 
 254. See id. at 419 n.4 (responding to the concurring opinion). 
 255. See Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the Fifth Circuit’s rule of orderliness). 
 256. See id. (stating that the rule of orderliness applies absent an express 
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Circuit cases applying deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ 
claims subsequent the Kingsley decision, making the rule of 
orderliness applicable.257 
IV. Detainees’ Claims Should Only Require Objective 
Unreasonableness 
“Deliberate indifference” should be removed from the lexicon 
of terms applying to pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement 
claims. Objective unreasonableness should replace it as the 
appropriate standard for culpability. Put simply, a pretrial 
detainee should only have to prove that state actors were being 
objectively unreasonable—as opposed to subjectively and 
deliberately indifferent—when their acts or omissions contributed 
to her injury. 
There are four general justifications for this change. The first 
is that substantive due process is an expansive concept, the 
contours of which are not limited in the same way as the provisions 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.258 The second reason follows from 
the first. Kingsley, consistent with an expansive interpretation of 
due process, recognized a clear difference between the rights 
afforded under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and 
those afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment.259 This 
difference applies even where prisoners and pretrial detainees 
allege identical conduct.260 Third, the justifications for applying 
deliberate indifference are unpersuasive in light of Kingsley and 
the expansive interpretation of due process.261 Finally, the 
 
overruling of the court’s precedent). 
 257. See Alderson, 848 F.3d at 419 n.4 (“Because the Fifth Circuit has 
continued to rely on Hare and to apply subjective standard post-Kingsley, this 
panel is bound by our rule of orderliness.”). 
 258. See infra notes 263–286 and accompanying text (defining the scope of 
substantive due process). 
 259. See infra notes 288–303 and accompanying text (discussing Kingsley’s 
recognition of a dichotomy between the rights afforded to prisoners and those 
afforded to pretrial detainees). 
 260. See infra notes 305–338 and accompanying text (discussing the different 
state-of-mind standards applied to excessive-force claims). 
 261. See infra notes 305–338 and accompanying text (comparing the proper 
interpretation of due process to courts’ justifications for applying deliberate 
indifference). 
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objective standard is workable and makes a genuine difference in 
practice.262 
A. The Contours of Substantive Due Process Are Not Limited by 
the Bill of Rights 
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids States from depriving 
“any person” of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”263 What is 
this “liberty” to which our Constitution refers? Justice Cardozo 
succinctly stated that it is “a concept of the greatest 
generality . . . . Its limits are not mapped and charted.”264 Nor 
should they be, as it is not a static concept.265 Instead, liberty under 
the Fourteenth Amendment can only be defined with reference to 
society’s attitude toward a particular government action at a given 
point in time.266 
Consistent with this dynamic interpretation is the Due 
Process Clause’s relationship with the Bill of Rights.267 The specific 
guarantees enumerated in the first eight amendments do not 
define the scope of due process or the liberty that it protects.268 
Instead, it consists of collective standards that take on their own 
character, apart from and beyond the particular demands of the 
 
 262. See infra notes 339–356 and accompanying text (providing hypothetical 
situations and applying different legal standards). 
 263. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 264. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 77 
(1921) (“May restraints that were arbitrary yesterday be useful and rational and 
therefore lawful today? May restraints that are arbitrary today become useful and 
rational and therefore lawful tomorrow? I have no doubt that the answer to these 
questions must be yes.”). 
 265. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the shift in our understanding of due process 
near the end of the Nineteenth Century). 
 266. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when 
it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion . . . .”). 
 267. Compare supra notes 264–266 and accompanying text (discussing the 
flexible interpretation of “liberty” interests contained in the Due Process Clause), 
with infra notes 266, 268, 269 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of 
Bill of Rights-derived restraints on the Due Process Clause). 
 268. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in 
my opinion, on its own bottom.”). 
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Bill of Rights provisions.269 The Due Process Clause is expansive, 
protecting against “all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints,”270 allowing it to recognize civil liberties 
that are absent from the face of the Constitution.271 
Due process rights stand on their own, even where their 
analysis requires some reference to an enumerated right.272 Such 
is the case with a pretrial detainee’s right to be free from harmful 
conditions of confinement.273 Reference is often made to the Eighth 
Amendment, even though detainees find relief under the Due 
Process Clause.274 The connection between the two constitutional 
provisions in this context is natural, as both detainees and 
convicted prisoners are being held by law enforcement in similar 
facilities.275 
 
 269. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Not until recently was it suggested that the Due 
Process Clause . . . was merely a compendious reference to the Bill of Rights 
whereby the States were now restricted in devising and enforcing their penal code 
precisely as is the Federal Government by the first eight amendments.”); see also 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact that 
an identical provision is found among the first eight amendments . . . suggests 
that due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty 
of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific 
prohibitions.”). 
 270. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (defining liberty under the Due Process Clause 
as a “rational continuum”). 
 271. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing the right to a 
lawful abortion as a subcategory within the broader right to privacy); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to marriage); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (recognizing various forms of economic 
freedom). 
 272. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In my view, the 
proper constitutional inquiry is whether this Connecticut statute offends the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates 
basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”). 
 273. See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text (discussing the reference 
to Eighth-Amendment standards inherent in conditions-of-confinement claims). 
 274. See, e.g. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.4 (1979) (“The State does not 
acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until 
after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt . . . without such an 
adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 275. Cf. Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(applying an Eighth-Amendment standard because prisoners and detainees are 
often harmed in similar factual contexts). 
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However, the provisions are not coextensive even when the 
contextual similarities are considered.276 The rights afforded to 
prisoners originate in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.277 This subjects them to the particular demands of that 
provision, as defined by its text and judicial doctrine.278 For 
conditions-of-confinement claims, the doctrine imposes deliberate 
indifference as the appropriate standard of culpability.279 
Due process has its own character, “apart from and beyond the 
particular demands” of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.280 It is more flexible, general, and inclusive than all 
provisions of the Eighth Amendment.281 Under the Due Process 
Clause, pretrial detainees “retain at least those constitutional 
rights” afforded to convicted prisoners.282 
These principles demand that pretrial detainees’ rights be 
viewed separately from those of convicted prisoners.283 Rote 
application of Eighth-Amendment doctrine to an independent due 
process right contradicts our understanding of the Fourteenth 
 
 276. See infra notes 267–271 (discussing the independent character of the Due 
Process Clause). 
 277. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“We therefore conclude 
that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
 278. See id. at 103–04 (describing conduct violative of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause as defined by judicial doctrine). 
 279. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2019) 
(discussing various types of claims that may be brought under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 280. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947) 
(discussing the proper scope of the due process inquiry). 
 281. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541–42 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
However, it is not the particular enumeration of the rights in the first 
eight Amendments which spells out the reach of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process, but rather, as was suggested in another 
context long before the adoption of that Amendment, those concepts 
which are considered to embrace those rights ‘which are fundamental; 
which belong to citizens of all free governments,’ for the purposes of 
securing which men enter into society. 
 282. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (comparing the relative 
constitutional liberties retained by convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees). 
 283. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text (discussing due process’ 
independent footing with respect to the Eight Amendment). 
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Amendment.284 Due process is not limited in such a way.285 The 
liberties afforded to detainees may be explored by reference to the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, but they stand on their 
own, not to be defined by the text, scope, or particularities of that 
provision,286 culpability requirements included.287 
B. Kingsley Recognized A Different Culpability Standard for 
Detainees’ Due Process Liberty 
When the Supreme Court decided Kingsley v. Hendrickson in 
2015, precedent required a subjective culpability standard for 
excessive-force claims under the Eighth Amendment.288 The 
defendants argued that the same standard should apply to 
detainees’ Fourteenth-Amendment claims.289 The Court responded 
by drawing a distinction between detainees and convicted 
prisoners on one basis:  That the two categories of plaintiffs are 
protected by two different constitutional interests.290 Justice 
Breyer stated: 
The language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the 
claims often differs. And most importantly, pretrial detainees 
(unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much 
less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’ Thus, there is no need here, 
as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case, to determine 
 
 284. See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (discussing the broad 
and flexible interpretation of the Due Process Clause). 
 285. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947) 
(stating that due process standards as “take on their own character, apart from 
and beyond the particular demands of the Bill of Rights provisions”). 
 286. See supra notes 278–282 and accompanying text (comparing the 
particularities of rights afforded under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 287. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–02 (2015) (stating that 
cases discussing the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause do not apply to 
state-of-mind issue before the Court). 
 288. Compare id. at 393–97 (“Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking us 
to determine whether the requirements of a § 1983 excessive force claim brought 
by a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective standard or only the objective 
standard.”), with Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (“[W]e suggested that 
the subjective aspect of an Eighth Amendment claim (with which the Court was 
concerned) can be distinguished from the objective facet of the same claim.”). 
 289. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400–02 (identifying cases brought by the 
Defendants). 
 290. Id. 
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when punishment is unconstitutional. [The Eighth Amendment 
cases] are relevant here only insofar as they address the 
practical importance of taking into account the legitimate 
safety-related concerns of those who run jails.291 
This language is consistent with the broad and independent 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.292 The particular 
demands of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause include an 
awareness that harm sufficient to constitute punishment will 
result.293 The Due Process Clause, on the other hand, is not 
beholden to the same demands.294 Because of this, there is “no 
need” for a court “to determine when punishment is 
unconstitutional” for a pretrial detainee to succeed on her 
due-process claim.295 The rights afforded to detainees under the 
Due Process Clause are not coextensive with the rights afforded to 
prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.296 
Because due process is a discrete concept,297 any decisions 
interpreting it should be either bound or persuaded by prior 
authority doing the same.298 For pretrial detainees, the authority 
reviewed by lower courts in determining culpability standards has 
largely consisted of decisions interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment.299 Although this practice has been inconsistent with 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. See infra notes 293–295 and accompanying text (comparing Kingsley’s 
reasoning with the dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause). 
 293. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3 (“[N]or cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994) 
(discussing the divergent standards of “recklessness” for civil law and criminal 
law before holding that the latter standard applies to Eighth-Amendment claims). 
 294. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947) 
(discussing the independent character of the Due Process Clause). 
 295. Compare id. (stating that due process “consists of collective standards 
which take on their own character . . . .”), with Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. 
Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) (rejecting the requirement of “punishment” for a pretrial 
detainee’s due-process claim). 
 296. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–02 (2015) 
(differentiating the rights afforded to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners). 
 297. See JOHN M. WALKER, JR., THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES:  
HOW DO PRECEDENTS LOSE THEIR BINDING EFFECT? 2 (Jordan Corrente Beck ed., 
2016) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis). 
 298. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis, 329 U.S. at 466–72 (stating that due 
process is an “independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness”). 
 299. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (“Although pre-trial detainees are not 
encompassed by the Eighth Amendment, 14th Amendment claims are generally 
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the concept that due process is free of the Bill of Rights’ 
particularities,300 it has primarily occurred in the absence of any 
clear doctrine by the Supreme Court.301 Now, however, the 
particularities of the Due Process Clause’s protection of pretrial 
detainees have been clarified.302 In opposition of the subjective 
standards that generally apply under the Eight Amendment,303 the 
Kingsley Court stated that “a pretrial detainee can prevail by 
providing only objective evidence that the challenged government 
action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”304 
C. Courts’ Justifications for Applying Deliberate Indifference Are 
Unpersuasive in Light of Kingsley and The Broad Interpretation 
of Due Process 
Two general arguments have been used in reasoning that 
deliberate indifference is the appropriate culpability standard for 
pretrial detainees’ due-process claims.305 The first essentially 
draws on interpretive comparisons between the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments,306 while the second considers the 
operational realities of managing correctional facilities.307 For the 
 
analyzed by the “deliberate indifference” standard.”). 
 300. See supra notes 272–287 and accompanying text (stating that due 
process rights “stand on their own, not determined by the text, scope, or 
particularities” of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). 
 301. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09(4)(a) (“Although its logical soundness 
is questionable, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have 
often applied the exacting standards of deliberate indifference (applicable to 
‘punishments’) to jail conditions.”). 
 302. See infra note 303 and accompanying text (stating the Supreme Court’s 
requirement for pretrial detainees’ due-process claims). 
 303.  See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (enumerating prisoners’ claims that 
require a showing of deliberate indifference). 
 304. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–400 (2015) (“Bell’s focus 
on punishment does not mean that proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required 
for a pretrial detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were 
violated.”). 
 305. See supra notes 105–172 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ 
justifications for the application of the deliberate-indifference standard). 
 306. See supra notes 108–187 and accompanying text (discussing 
considerations that factor into the meanings of both constitutional provisions). 
 307. See supra notes 123–198 and accompanying text (discussing 
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reasons discussed below, neither of these justifications is 
persuasive.308 
1. Interpretive Comparisons 
Two interpretive comparisons have been made for justifying 
the attachment of Eighth-Amendment standards to due-process 
claims.309 The first is that both amendments “draw [their] meaning 
from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”310 This fails to account for the differences 
between the two provisions.311 Simply because the rights provided 
under both are dynamic does not mean that they are equivalent.312 
Under the Eighth Amendment, the phrase means that the 
State, though having the power to punish, is confined to only doing 
so “within the limits of civilized standards.”313 The meaning of the 
term under due process states that conduct is violative when it is 
“repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”314 Though both 
definitions are somewhat open-ended, one discernible difference 
between the two is clear:  The state has no power to punish under 
the Due Process Clause.315 Punishment requires a state actor to 
 
considerations for corrections staff in facilities that house both convicted 
prisoners and pretrial detainees). 
 308. See infra notes 309–322 and accompanying text (comparing courts’ 
reasoning for applying deliberate indifference to due-process claims in light of 
judicial precedent). 
 309. See supra notes 108–122 and accompanying text (stating the positions of 
the Ninth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals when they initially applied 
deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims). 
 310. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(comparing the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses). 
 311. See supra notes 272–282 and accompanying text (delineating the rights 
afforded under the two constitutional provisions). 
 312. See supra notes 276–286 and accompanying text (discussing the unique 
character of the Due Process Clause). 
 313. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“Fines, imprisonment and 
even execution may be imposed depending on the enormity of the crime, but any 
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally 
suspect.”). 
 314. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976) (discussing precedent 
that touches on the respective meanings of the two constitutional provisions). 
 315. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400–02 (distinguishing the rights afforded 
under the Due Process Clause and those derived from the Cruel and Unusual 
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appreciate her conduct,316 but Kingsley tells us that there is no 
such requirement when the plaintiff’s rights are derived from due 
process.317 
The second comparison states that pretrial detainees’ 
due-process rights are “at least as great as” those afforded under 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.”318 This at least 
recognizes that they are not coextensive.319 However, the 
statement itself fails to explain why detainees should be subject to 
a requirement that is peculiar to Eighth-Amendment analysis.320 
If anything, it tends to support the independent interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause,321 which rejects the idea that it is beholden 
to the “particular demands” of any specific Bill of Rights provision, 
including the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.322 
2. Operational Realities 
Many correctional facilities hold both convicted prisoners and 
pretrial detainees.323 Because of this reality, the deliberate 
indifference standard has been applied to detainees’ claims as 
“distinguishing” due process and Eighth-Amendment standards 
and “would require courts to evaluate the details of slight 
 
Punishment Clause). 
 316. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing the threshold for 
state-of-mind issues involving unconstitutional punishment). 
 317. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400–02 (“[P]retrial detainees cannot be 
punished at all, much less maliciously and sadistically.”). 
 318. See Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1992) (justifying the 
application of deliberate indifference to due-process claims). 
 319. See supra notes 276–287 and accompanying text (contrasting the 
contours of the two constitutional provisions). 
 320. See infra note 324 and accompanying text (discussing application of the 
deliberate indifference standard to detainees’ claims). 
 321. Compare Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]retrial 
detainees’ due process rights are ‘at least as great as’ those afforded under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.”), with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 
(1979) (“Under the Due Process Clause, pretrial detainees retain ‘at least those 
constitutional rights’ afforded to convicted prisoners.”). 
 322. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947) 
(discussing the independent character of the Due Process Clause). 
 323. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(justifying the application of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims). 
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differences in conditions.”324 This argument is premised on 
language by the Supreme Court that cautioned lower courts from 
becoming “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.”325 
There are two issues with this use of authority.326 
The first starts with the Supreme Court’s warning itself.327 In 
context, the Court was cautioning against judicial solutions for 
operational issues in place of those devised by corrections 
officials.328 It explicitly drew a line, however, at the point where 
the officials’ solutions would violate “any prohibition of the 
Constitution.”329 The Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment 
each contain unique constitutional prohibitions.330 In accordance 
with the dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the 
analyses of these separate prohibitions are not parallel.331 
Therefore, a court may be required “to evaluate the details of slight 
differences in conditions” when faced with two plaintiffs, one 
 
 324. See id. (“This court holds that in regard to providing pretrial detainees 
with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the minimum 
standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the 
eighth amendment for convicted persons.”). 
 325. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (“There was a time not too 
long ago when the federal judiciary took a completely ‘hands-off’ approach to the 
problem of prison administration. In recent years, however, these courts have 
largely disregarded this ‘hands-off’ attitude and waded into this complex arena.”). 
 326. See infra notes 327–337 and accompanying text (discussing issues with 
courts’ practical justification for applying deliberate indifference to pretrial 
detainees’ claims). 
 327. See infra notes 328–332 and accompanying text (providing context to 
judicial precedent). 
 328. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (“The deplorable conditions 
and Draconian restrictions of some of our Nation’s prisons are too well known to 
require recounting here, and federal courts rightly have condemned these sordid 
aspects of our prison systems.”). 
 329. See id. (“This does not mean that constitutional rights are not to be 
scrupulously observed.”). 
 330. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[D]ue process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty 
of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific 
prohibitions.”). 
 331. See supra notes 266–282 (discussing the individual character and scope 
of the Due Process Clause); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–
02 (2015) (stating that Eighth Amendment cases “are relevant here only insofar 
as they address the practical importance of taking into account the legitimate 
safety-related concerns of those who run jails”). 
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pointing at the Due Process Clause and the other claiming 
protection under the Eighth Amendment.332 
The second issue with the justification comes from Kingsley.333 
There, the Court noted that its objective unreasonableness 
analysis must be done with “deference to the policies and practices 
needed to maintain order and institutional security.”334 
Essentially, the objective analysis is not blind to “the legitimate 
interests in managing a jail.”335 This is consistent with the 
requirement that courts refrain from becoming “enmeshed in the 
minutiae of prison operations.”336 However, the Supreme Court did 
not see deference to corrections officials as an impediment 
preventing the formulation of different culpability standards for 
prisoners and pretrial detainees.337 While institutional concerns 
must be considered in litigation arising out of correctional 
facilities, they are not sufficient to justify the transplantation of an 
Eighth-Amendment culpability standard to due-process claims.338 
 
 332. Compare Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(justifying the parallel application of deliberate indifference on the basis that 
applying separate analyses to the two constitutional provisions would require it 
to become “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”), with supra notes 
323–331 (discussing the requirement that courts treat due process as 
independent of the demands of the Eighth Amendment, even where doing so 
would require it to become “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”). 
 333. See infra notes 334–336 and accompanying text (discussing the 
requirement that courts be deferential to the decisions of corrections officials). 
 334. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398–401 (2015) (discussing 
the workability of an objective standard in excessive-force claims). 
 335. See id. (noting that courts must take into account the State’s legitimate 
interests in operating correctional facilities). 
 336. Compare id. (requiring “deference to the policies and practices needed to 
maintain order and institutional security”), with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
562 (1979) (“The wide range of ‘judgment calls’ that meet constitutional and 
statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of 
the Government.”). 
 337. See id. at 396–401 (finding that an objective standard should apply to 
pretrial detainees while noting that courts must be deferential to corrections 
officials and conceding that a subjective standard applies to convicted prisoners 
in a similar context). 
 338. Cf. id. (applying different standards and considering the concerns of 
corrections officials). 
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D. The Objective Standard Makes a Big Difference While 
Requiring a Small Change 
The distinction in the tests that courts will apply under either 
deliberate indifference or objective unreasonableness is minute.339 
Only one element for any given conditions-of-confinement claim 
will require a change.340 However, the success of a pretrial 
detainee’s claim may hinge on the distinction.341 
In practice, the only difference between an objective standard 
and deliberate indifference is how a defendant’s “reckless” state of 
mind is defined.342 Deliberate indifference entails two prongs.343 
The first asks whether the deprivation alleged objectively results 
“in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”344 There have been a number of decisions defining 
conduct sufficient to meet this requirement in different contexts.345 
The second prong requires that the defendant is aware of a 
substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff, but disregards that risk 
in her intentional acts or omissions.346 This second requirement 
essentially asks whether the defendant was criminally reckless 
with respect to her conduct.347 
 
 339. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (defining the difference 
between objective unreasonableness and deliberate indifference). 
 340. See infra notes 348–352 (describing the different definitions of 
“recklessness” as applied to conditions-of-confinement claims). 
 341. See infra notes 353–356 and accompanying text (providing a hypothetical 
situation and applying both state-of-mind standards). 
 342. See infra notes 343–351 and accompanying text (explaining the 
difference between deliberate indifference and objective unreasonableness). 
 343. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (defining the requirements for a violation of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). 
 344. See id. (“[T]he deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently 
serious . . .”). 
 345. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09(4)(e)(iii)(A) (providing examples of 
deprivations that have been held to violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 346. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists, and he must also draw that inference.”). 
 347. See id. at 836–37 (“The criminal law, however, generally permits a 
finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he 
is aware.”). 
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The test for objective unreasonableness retains the first prong 
of the deliberate indifference analysis.348 The second prong, 
however, would drop the requirement that the defendant was 
aware of a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff.349 Instead, the 
substantial risk of harm would have to be “so obvious that it should 
be known” by the defendant.350 The conduct must be intentional, 
but the defendant need not be aware of the risk of harm created by 
that conduct.351 Unlike deliberate indifference, this standard only 
requires recklessness akin to that found in tort law.352 
Although there is only one difference between the two tests, 
the success of a pretrial detainee’s claim may hinge on which is 
applied.353 Suppose that Corey, an African-American man, is 
arrested on a Friday evening in Dallas for driving under the 
influence. Dennis and Mac, two members of the white-nationalist 
organization Vanguard America, were arrested the night before 
when police officers raided their apartment and discovered a closet 
packed with C-4, a plastic explosive. All three of the arrestees were 
transported to the Dallas County Detention Center. 
Charlie, a corrections officer at the Detention Center, arrived 
at work on Friday morning to find fervent discussion about Dennis 
and Mac. He was informed that both detainees had previously been 
incarcerated for various violent crimes and that Dennis is wanted 
for questioning out of state in connection with the disappearance 
of a local American Civil Liberties Union officer. Charlie is even 
directed to the detainees’ social media profiles, which primarily 
consist of violent threats directed at minority groups and demands 
for an insurrection against the Federal Government. 
 
 348. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(stating that “the deprivation alleged must objectively be sufficiently serious”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 349. See id. at 1071 (“[A] pretrial detainee need not prove those subjective 
elements about the officer’s actual awareness of the level of risk.”). 
 350. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (comparing different 
standards of recklessness). 
 351. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070–71 (explaining the different state-of-mind 
standards for a defendant’s awareness of a risk and her physical acts or 
omissions). 
 352. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (stating that “the term recklessness is not 
self-defining”). 
 353. See supra subsection IV.D (discussing the different standards applied 
between “deliberate indifference” and “objective unreasonableness”). 
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After Corey is processed at the Detention Center, Charlie must 
assign and escort him to a holding cell. Corey is so inebriated that 
he can hardly stand, so Charlie has to support him during their 
walk. The cell Corey is assigned to contains both Dennis and Mac. 
Without so much of a thought, Charlie drags him into the cell and 
hastily walks away to go on break. After he returns to the 
Detention Center, Charlie learns that Corey sustained serious 
injuries in an attack by his cellmates. 
Corey files a § 1983 claim against Charlie on the basis that he 
failed to protect him from the assault, in violation of the Due 
Process Clause. Because he filed the claim in Texas, the court will 
require Corey to demonstrate that Charlie was deliberately 
indifferent.354 If the litigation reaches a jury, Corey must convince 
them that Charlie was aware of the risk that other detainees would 
assault him, but disregarded that risk and left him in the cell 
anyway.355 If the jury finds that Charlie was not thinking about 
the potential risk because he was in a hurry to get to lunch, Corey’s 
claim fails.  
Suppose instead that all of this occurred in Las Vegas. A court 
there would apply objective unreasonableness instead of deliberate 
indifference.356 Corey is not required to prove that Charlie was 
actually aware of the risk, but only that he should have been aware 
of it.357 Charlie knew that Dennis and Mac were violent and racist. 
He also knew that they had stockpiled weapons of mass 
destruction. Finally, Charlie knew that Corey was a member of a 
group that his cellmates had violently threatened and that he was 
in a vulnerable state. On the basis of these facts, Corey can prevail 
by demonstrating that Charlie should have been aware of the risk 
that he would be assaulted in the cell. Unlike the proceedings in 
Texas, a court in Nevada will not deny him relief simply because 
the defendant was in a hurry. 
 
 354. See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 2017) (applying deliberate indifference to a failure-to-protect claim). 
 355. See supra notes 344–346 and accompanying text (describing the 
subjective component of the deliberate-indifference analysis). 
 356. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying 
an objective unreasonableness standard for conditions-of-confinement claims 
brought by pretrial detainees). 
 357. See supra notes 348–351 and accompanying text (describing the 
state-of-mind requirement of the objective unreasonableness analysis). 
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V. Conclusion 
The application of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ 
conditions-of-confinement claims has always been in error. The 
Fourteenth Amendment demanded something different from the 
start. Admittedly, courts were somewhat in the dark with respect 
to what that should be. Now, however, Kingsley has provided 
much-needed visibility. It is time for courts to abandon the 
subjective inquiry and instead ask whether those acting under 
color of state law were objectively unreasonable when they 
deprived detainees of their constitutional liberties afforded by the 
Due Process Clause. 
